Fault lines: A Disinformation Simulation

Introduction

There is a constantly growing body of research and analysis examining how hostile information operations work: the tactics, the platforms, the amplification networks, and the geopolitical motivations behind them. Far less attention has been paid to how the organisations responsible for responding to these operations actually function under pressure. The uncomfortable truth is that in real disinformation crises, internal organisational dynamics frequently prove more damaging than the external threat itself. Well-resourced institutions staffed with talented people still produce fragmented, slow, and sometimes contradictory responses to information attacks. Understanding why this happens, and what can be done about it, is the challenge Faultlines is designed to address. 

Faultlines is a persona-based strategic communications wargame in which participants are assigned realistic roles with visible professional identities, hidden personal motivations, and secret objectives that create natural tension with other players. The game places teams into immersive crisis scenarios and requires them to produce concrete communications deliverables under time pressure, revealing the organisational dysfunction that can undermine real world crisis response. 

The following is an overview of how the game works, using a NATO based disinformation scenario to illustrate narrative design, persona system, game mechanics, decision points, deliverables, and complication cards that together create a challenging and rewarding exercise. 

Why This Matters

The disinformation field has made extraordinary progress on the supply side of the problem: who creates hostile content, how it spreads, and what it contains. What remains underdeveloped is the demand side: how organisations coordinate their response when an information attack lands. This gap matters because hostile actors are increasingly designing their operations to exploit domestic frictions, targeting public trust around health policy, immigration, economic inequality, and a wide range of issues far removed from traditional defence and security. The consequence is that every organisation and government department is now a potential player in countering disinformation, whether that falls within their remit or not. 

Wargaming and simulation exercises have long been used to prepare teams for external adversaries. They rarely, however, test the internal dynamics that so often determine whether a response succeeds or fails. Institutional politics, competing priorities, siloed departments, and the friction that emerges when multiple stakeholders must coordinate under pressure can pose a greater risk than any hostile actor. Decades of organisational research confirm this pattern. Siloed working exists in over 80% of organisations studied, and nearly all staff report that it negatively affects performance. NATO's own strategic communications history offers a compelling illustration, with competing priorities between internal communities consuming effort that should have been directed at operational challenges. 

The critical insight is that effective coordination under these conditions is a trainable capability. Decades of peer-reviewed research demonstrate that structured perspective-taking exercises measurably improve collaboration, reduce inter-group bias, and unlock creative problem-solving in complex multi-stakeholder environments. NATO and defence institutions have formally endorsed wargaming as a tool for strategic learning and decision preparation, yet a 2020 RAND Corporation study explicitly identifies the information environment as critically underdeveloped in current wargaming practice. Despite progress within defence, non-defence and non-security organisations who find themselves increasingly on the front line of information operations remain largely absent from these approaches. 

Faultlines responds to this reality. It takes a format traditionally reserved for military and national security teams and extends it to everyone working in communications. The game bridges the gap between understanding disinformation analytically and being able to respond to it operationally, translating knowledge about how information attacks work into the practiced coordination that effective response demands. 

Game Mechanics

The Scenario: Operation Fractured Trust

Operation Fractured Trust places participants into the heart of a NATO strategic communications crisis triggered by a hostile information operation. The scenario opens at 0830 hours at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Earlier that morning, coordinated social media accounts began circulating a video appearing to show NATO military personnel firing on unarmed civilians during a training exercise in a Baltic partner nation. The footage has spread rapidly, accumulating over 12 million views and being amplified by state media outlets and coordinated inauthentic networks. 

Initial technical analysis suggests the video is a sophisticated deepfake, but this assessment remains preliminary and cannot be publicly confirmed for at least four hours while forensic teams complete their work. In the meantime, the government of the affected partner nation has requested an urgent response, allied member states are fielding media enquiries, and the Secretary General’s office has convened an emergency working group to develop a coordinated response. 

The participants are that working group. 

The scenario is designed to create several layers of pressure simultaneously. A scheduled NATO press briefing is 90 minutes away and journalists are already asking questions. Three allied nations have troops visible in the footage, and each national capital is developing its own response. Intelligence assessment suggests this is the opening phase of a broader information operation timed to coincide with upcoming Alliance exercises. Public anger in the partner nation is rising, and protest activity is being organised for the afternoon. 

The group has access to a mix of confirmed facts, preliminary assessments, and acknowledged unknowns. They know the video appeared simultaneously on multiple platforms and that the uniforms and equipment shown are accurate to actual exercises, but no field incident reports match the events depicted. They know technical teams assess with moderate confidence that the video contains manipulated elements, but legal advisors have cautioned that premature claims of ‘fake’ could create liability if any element proves authentic. The full scope of the information operation and whether additional releases are planned remains unknown. 

The Secretary General exists as an offstage principal. The working group develops recommendations for the Secretary General’s approval, but no single player has authority to override the group. The facilitator may occasionally channel feedback from the Secretary General’s office to create additional pressure, but this is used sparingly and never grants any participant special authority. 

The Personas

Fifteen personas represent authentic functions in NATO communications decision making. Each combines a nationality with a professional role to create realistic dynamics, and multiple versions of similar roles with different national perspectives generating natural tension and coalition opportunities.  

For this scenario the personas span six categories:  

  • Strategic Communications Advisors 

  • Military Representatives 

  • Intelligence and Security 

  • Partner Nation Representatives  

  • Legal and Policy 

  • Media Operations 

Each persona has three components. The visible role card describes the character’s name, nationality, position, background, communication style, and general disposition. This is shared openly with all players. The hidden motivations describe the character’s personal priorities, frustrations, and success criteria. These are known only to the player. The hidden deliverable objectives identify specific elements the player wants included in the team’s outputs. 

To illustrate how this works in practice, two persona profiles are described below. 

Kristjan Tamm: Estonian Strategic Communications Advisor 

Visible role: Kristjan Tamm is a Strategic Communications Advisor in the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. A former Estonian Government Office communications director, he brings extensive direct experience of countering Russian information operations targeting the Baltic states. His communication style is direct, urgent, and impatient. He frames issues as existential rather than procedural, using phrases such as ‘we have seen this playbook before’ and ‘delay is exactly what they want.’ 

Hidden motivations: Kristjan has been aware of Russian information operations his entire career. He knows exactly what this is and exactly how it will develop if NATO responds weakly. He finds Western European caution infuriating because he has seen the consequences of slow responses firsthand. He believes this crisis is an opportunity to demonstrate that Baltic expertise should be leading NATO’s approach, not following it. He wants a response that treats this as a serious attack, not a communications inconvenience to be managed. 

Hidden deliverable objectives: Kristjan wants the Core Narrative to characterise the incident explicitly as an ‘attack’ or ‘hostile act’ rather than merely ‘disinformation.’ He wants the Holding Statement to reference NATO’s commitment to defending allies against all forms of aggression, including information warfare. He wants the Q&A preparation to include strong language rejecting any suggestion that NATO should modify its behaviour in response to adversary manipulation. 

Eva Hoffmann: German Ministry of Defence Liaison 

Visible role: Eva Hoffmann is a senior civil servant from the German Federal Ministry of Defence, seconded to support NATO communications coordination. She is known for thorough process adherence and close attention to legal implications, maintaining contact with Berlin throughout crises. Her communication style is careful and procedural, with phrases such as ‘we should confirm with capitals first’ and ‘what are the legal implications of this language.’ 

Hidden motivations: German forces are visible in the footage, and Berlin is extremely sensitive to any suggestion of misconduct. The German public and media are historically sceptical of military operations and quick to criticise. Hoffmann needs to ensure that nothing in the NATO response creates domestic political problems in Germany. This means careful language, proper process, and avoiding any statements that could be interpreted as acknowledgment of fault before a full investigation. She is also concerned about maintaining good relations with the partner nation, which has significant economic ties with Germany. 

Hidden deliverable objectives: Hoffmann wants the Core Narrative to include an explicit statement that no conclusions about conduct can be drawn until investigation is complete. She wants the Holding Statement to reference the investigation process and timeline for findings. She wants the Allied Coordination Framework to require capital coordination before any national spokesperson makes statements about the incident. 

The tension between personas 

The design of these two personas illustrates the kind of productive friction the game creates. Tamm wants urgency, strong language, and a characterisation of the incident as a hostile act. Hoffmann wants process, caution, and language that preserves flexibility until investigations are complete. Both positions are entirely legitimate, reflecting real dynamics within NATO. The game forces participants to navigate these tensions and find workable compromises, just as they would in a genuine crisis. 

The full game features fifteen personas across the six categories, with recommended combinations for groups of different sizes. A minimum of six players allows one representative from each category. The facilitator selects personas that preserve key tensions: speed versus process, attribution versus caution, unity versus independence, partner nation needs versus Alliance procedure, and practical media requirements versus strategic framing. 

Complication Cards

Complication cards are introduced by the facilitator at intervals during the session based on the pace and dynamics of the group. Each complication takes effect immediately and requires a response within a strict time limit. Complications create pressure and force prioritisation without invalidating work already completed. Two examples show how they function. 

Complication: Journalist Deadline 

A journalist from a major international outlet contacts the NATO press office. They are running a story in five minutes with or without NATO comment. They want a single quotable sentence on whether NATO believes the video is authentic. The group has three minutes of real time to agree on a single sentence that can be provided as a quote. If no consensus is reached, the story runs with ‘NATO declined to comment.’ The quote, or the refusal, will be referenced by other media and will affect the planned briefing. 

This complication forces the group to make a rapid decision with incomplete discussion. It reveals which voices dominate under extreme time pressure and whether the group can produce usable language quickly enough to shape a developing story. 

Complication: Russian Foreign Ministry Statement 

The Russian Foreign Ministry issues a formal statement expressing ‘grave concern’ over the footage and condemning what it calls NATO’s pattern of hostility towards civilian populations. The statement accuses NATO of attempting to cover up the truth and demands an independent international investigation. International media are picking up the statement and requesting a NATO reaction. The group must decide within four minutes whether to respond immediately with a standalone reactive statement, incorporate a response into the wider deliverables without issuing a separate reaction, or decline to respond directly and let the planned briefing speak for itself. 

This complication introduces a genuine strategic dilemma. An immediate response risks elevating the Russian narrative and creating a back‐and‐forth dynamic. Folding it into wider deliverables risks appearing slow. Ignoring it entirely risks allowing the framing to stand unchallenged. The choice the group makes reveals their instincts about escalation management and narrative control.  

Decision Points

The group faces five key decision points during the exercise, each presenting two legitimate options with genuine trade‐offs. Discussion should lead to consensus, though personas may advocate strongly for particular approaches based on their hidden objectives. Two examples illustrate how these decisions work. 

Decision 1: Initial Stance 

Option A: Confident Rebuttal. Lead with strong language that the footage appears to be disinformation, emphasising NATO’s commitment to rules of engagement and civilian protection. Project confidence that investigation will confirm manipulation. 

Option B: Cautious Acknowledgment. Acknowledge awareness of the footage, confirm investigation is underway, and avoid characterising authenticity until analysis is complete. Project measured professionalism. 

The first public statement sets the tone for everything that follows. A strong stance projects confidence but creates risk if any element proves authentic. A cautious stance demonstrates responsibility but may appear defensive or guilty, and may allow the adversary narrative to solidify.  

This decision immediately activates persona tensions: Tamm’s urgency pushes toward confident rebuttal, while Hoffmann’s caution pulls toward measured acknowledgment. The intelligence liaison must balance supporting the group with protecting sources and methods. The partner nation representative needs something their government can point to as a demonstration of solidarity. 

Decision 2: Attribution Approach 

Option A: Name the Adversary. Explicitly attribute the information operation to the suspected state actor based on pattern analysis and intelligence assessment. Call out the disinformation campaign as an attack on Alliance cohesion. 

Option B: Describe Patterns Without Attribution. Describe the coordinated nature of the campaign and its characteristics without naming specific actors. Focus on the manipulation rather than the manipulator. 

Attribution is a significant escalatory step. Explicit naming creates a clear narrative but requires confidence in the assessment and acceptance of diplomatic consequences. Pattern description maintains flexibility but may appear evasive. This decision draws the intelligence and cyber personas into direct tension with the media operations specialist, who knows journalists will immediately ask ‘who did this?’ and needs a quotable answer. 

Team Deliverables

The working group must produce five concrete outputs before the deadline. These are not discussion points or recommendations. They are finished products that can be evaluated against the standards of a real crisis response. For each games these deliverables are flexible based on circumstance. 

  • Core Narrative Framework: A three‐point message structure addressing what the Alliance knows (and acknowledges it does not yet know), what it is doing about the situation, and what it asks of others. 

  • Press Briefing Script: A 90‐second speaking script for the designated spokesperson, covering an opening acknowledgment of the situation, key messages, and a clear call to action. 

  • Holding Statement: A written statement of approximately 150 words for immediate release, suitable for NATO official channels, distribution to allied capitals, and provision to the partner nation government. 

  • Q&A Preparation: Anticipated hostile questions with agreed responses, covering a minimum of five questions on topics including the authenticity of the footage, why NATO cannot immediately prove it is fabricated, accountability if any element proves true, impact on exercises and partnership, and the response to allegations of adversary involvement. 

  • Allied Coordination Framework: Brief guidance for member state communications teams covering what national spokespersons should and should not say, how to refer enquiries back to NATO headquarters, and the timeline for coordinated updates. 

Each of these deliverables becomes a site of negotiation as different personas push for their hidden objectives to be reflected in the final outputs. The Core Narrative, for instance, must satisfy Tamm’s desire for strong ‘attack’ language, Hoffmann’s insistence on caveats about the ongoing investigation, the French Political Military Advisor’s preference for referencing European security architecture, and the Canadian Strategic Communications Advisor’s push for framing that emphasises collective rather than nation‐led response. The resulting compromises, gaps, and contradictions mirror the outputs of real multinational coordination.  

The Debrief

A structured debrief follows the exercise, during which participants step out of character and reveal their hidden motivations and deliverable objectives. The debrief is where learning consolidates. Without reflection, the experience remains just an experience. 

The facilitator guides discussion through several areas:  

  • Hidden objectives, the group examines which objectives were achieved, which were blocked, and why.  

  • Coalition dynamics, the group considers what informal alliances formed, whether anyone shifted their position during discussion, and how national perspectives shaped the conversation.  

  • Communications strategy, the group evaluates the final deliverables: what message does NATO actually send, where are the gaps or contradictions, and how would an adversary exploit weaknesses in the response? 

The most valuable part of the debrief connects the exercise to real world experience. Participants are asked which personas they recognise from their own organisations, what dynamics from the exercise they have experienced in actual crises, and what strategies for managing competing priorities they will take away. The game is designed so that these connections emerge naturally. The personas are drawn from authentic roles and realistic motivations, and the tensions they create are the same tensions that communications professionals navigate every day. 

Building Resilience Before the Next Crisis

The ability to coordinate effectively under pressure, across organisations with different cultures, priorities, and constraints, is not something that emerges naturally from good intentions or written guidance. It must be practised. Faultlines creates the conditions for that practice by making the competing pressures and institutional friction of real crisis response visible, dynamic, and engaging within a structured exercise. The ability to reflect afterwards on how these dynamics shaped the team's effectiveness is the fundamental learning that builds understanding and capability for future responses. 

The personas are drawn from authentic roles and realistic motivations. The tensions they create are the same tensions that communications professionals navigate in every real crisis. The question is whether the people responsible for responding to information threats, not just those in defence and security but across government and civil society, will have practised navigating these dynamics before the next crisis demands it. 

References

  • Hoever, I.J., van Knippenberg, D., van Ginkel, W.P. and Barkema, H.G. (2012) 'Fostering Team Creativity: Perspective Taking as Key to Unlocking Diversity's Potential', Journal of Applied Psychology, https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-17920-001   

  • Galinsky, A.D., Maddux, W.W., Gilin, D. and White, J.B. (2008) 'Why It Pays to Get Inside the Head of Your Opponent: The Differential Effects of Perspective Taking and Empathy in Negotiations', Psychological Science,  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5452609